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THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE  AND PUBLIC HOUSING 
 AUTHORITIES: CAN YOU SAY THAT HERE? 
 
In two  cases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has applied the so-called 
public forum doctrine under the First Amendment, and has upheld the power of public housing 
authorities to control what was said and when it was said on their properties.1 However, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts took exception with those holdings, and found that a 
housing authority’s attempt to limit the speech rights of persons on its premises to be violative of 
the First Amendment.2 Other courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have become involved 
with the issue.    This article will review briefly the status of the public forum line of cases under 
the First Amendment, and then consider  these conflicting decisions with a view to the public 
policy issues raised by this interesting question of the free speech rights of tenants of subsidized 
housing. While it is true that under the classic public forum line of analysis the government can 
often restrict or prohibit speech on property it owns and operates, where that public property is 
the homes of poor families or elderly and appears to be a typical neighborhood, a different 
answer may be necessary, as the Massachusetts court so held. 
 First, however, a brief review of what is a public housing authority is in order.  Federal 
statutes create a funding mechanism by which local entities are able to buy, build and operate 
various housing programs for the poor.3 The local housing authority takes this money, perhaps 
together with state or local funds,4 and creates apartment buildings of various sorts, ranging from 
high rises in massive complexes to small townhouses in the country5 which are made available to 
families, elderly or disabled individuals who meet the various regulations governing tenant 
selection.6 In most respects, these public housing authority developments resemble privately 
owned housing, and are of course, the homes of the residents of those developments. 
2A.  The Government’s Right to Control First Amendment Activities on Property It Owns: 
The Public Forum Doctrine. 
 Beginning with Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association7, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has handed down a series of cases implementing a tripartite analysis of 
claims involving First Amendment challenges to restrictions on the use of government owned 
property for speech activities. In doing so it has established what has become known as the 
public forum analysis.  This analytic methodology is designed to “strike a balance between the 
public’s right of access to public property for expressive activities and the government’s interest 
in limiting the property’s use based on the character of the property at issue.”8
In Perry, a school district had granted to the teachers’ union, as part of a collective 
bargaining agreement, the exclusive right to access the interschool mail system and teacher 
mailboxes within the system.9 A rival union challenged this practice, seeking similar access.10 
The court found that there was no violation of the First Amendment.11 In its reasoning, the 
court recognized three different categories of publicly owned property, or public forums: 
traditional or quintessentially public fora, limited public fora, and nonpublic fora.12 A traditional 
public forum is one that “by long tradition or by governmental fiat [has] been devoted to 
assembly and debate....”13 A limited public forum is one that is “generally open to the public 
even if [the entity] was not required to create the forum in the first place.”14 A nonpublic forum 
is one that “is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication....”15 This 
analysis followed from the fact that the government in this type of case is not acting as the 
sovereign, but as the proprietor of property.  “[T]he state, no less than a private property owner, 
3has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated.”16 
In a public forum, the government landowner may limit speech and impose content-based 
exclusions from the forum only upon a showing of a compelling state interest and that the rule in 
issue is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.17 Further, content-neutral regulations of the time, 
place, and manner of expression are permissible only when they are narrowly tailored to a 
significant governmental interest, and the regulations leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.18 In limited public fora, the government is bound by the same rules as in the 
general all purpose public forum.  However, it is permitted to limit the purpose of the forum, that 
is, limit the forum’s use to certain groups only, or for expression on certain subjects only.19 
In non-public fora, the rules are different.  Because the First Amendment does not 
“guarantee  access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by the government”19, in 
addition to time, place, and manner restrictions, the government may “reserve the forum for its 
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the 
speaker’s view.”20 
Where the government has fully dedicated property it owns and controls to expressive 
use,  only the most limited and important interests will support closing expressive activities in 
that forum.  In limited public forums, a particular range of expressions will be allowed, subject to 
those same stringent constraints on restricting speech.  But in non-public fora, outright bans on 
speech can be imposed based merely on a reasonable relation between the restriction and the 
nature of the property.21 
4Thus in Perry the court found that the internal mail facility at the school could be 
reserved for the use of the union which represented all teachers in the city, and access by a 
competing union which did not officially represent the entire body of teachers was not 
required.22 As the court summed up in Perry,
When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the State may not pick and chose.  
Conversely on government property that has not been made a public forum, not all 
speech is equally situated, and the State may draw distinctions which relate to the special 
purpose for which the property is used.  As we have explained above, for a school mail 
facility, the difference in status between the exclusive bargaining representative and its 
rival is such a distinction.23 
Immediately after Perry the court struck down a statute prohibiting picketing on the 
public sidewalks surrounding the Supreme Court building, finding the sidewalks are the type of 
government owned property historically dedicated to unlimited free speech.  Accordingly, the 
sidewalks were public forum where the state could not ban picketing.24 However, a time 
limitation on the use of public parks was upheld despite the parks nature as a public forum, as 
such limitation was a reasonable time, place, manner restriction which was content neutral, left 
open other avenues of communication, and was designed to support the state’s interest in the use 
of public parks.25 The Supreme Court has also held that a city could ban the posting of signs on 
public property for the esthetic and economic interests of eliminating clutter and visual blight.26 
At issue was the placing of signs on street light posts within the city.  The court held that street 
light posts were not a type of property historically dedicated to for public communication and 
thus were not a public forum.27 
In determining whether the property in question is or is not a public forum, the 
governmental owner’s intent is a key factor.  In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. 
Fund,28 the Supreme Court found that a charity campaign, conducted on federal property, was 
5not a public forum.  As such, restrictions on the number and type of charities allowed to 
participate and the length of the messages was proper under the mere reasonableness standard.29 
In doing so the court noted that it will not reach to find a public forum “in face of clear evidence 
of a contrary intent, nor will we infer that the government intended to create a public forum when 
the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activities.”30 
Thus, even in what might at first blush appear to be an area by tradition dedicated to 
communication activities and thus a public forum, such as sidewalks, if the location of the 
sidewalk is such that it evidences an intent not to hold it open to communicative activities, the 
court will find even these areas to be a nonpublic forum.  Sidewalks in front of post offices, 
needed to insure efficient operation of the mail system, could be restricted from speech activities, 
and such a restriction would be upheld unless it proved to be “arbitrary, capricious, or 
invidious”.31 In U.S. v. Kokinda,32 the court again addressed the issue of speech on sidewalks, 
this time on a sidewalk leading to the US Post Office.  The plurality found that the postal 
sidewalk, lying entirely within the property of the Post Office,  was a  nonpublic forum, and thus 
the ban on solicitations on the sidewalks of the property was reasonable to insure efficient 
operation of the postal office.33 The test used to determine whether the restriction is reasonable 
or not was whether it was “arbitrary, capricious, or invidious”.34 
Similarly, the sidewalk in front of a publicly owned airport was not found to be a public 
forum.  Rather, the court found that this type of property had not been dedicated from time 
immemorial to expressive use by the government.35 As the sidewalks were not public fora, the 
ban on solicitations thereon was upheld as a reasonable restriction on the use of the property.36 
However, the majority went on to find that an outright ban on the free distribution of literature on 
6the property was not reasonable, as it presented few problems other than perhaps litter.37 
In a fractured opinion that produced no majority, the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld 
some restrictions even in a public forum.   The court upheld a regulation which banned  all 
political speech, but only political speech, within a 100 foot area surrounding the entrance of a 
polling place.38 The plurality opinion noted that this was without doubt a content-based 
restriction, but found that the regulation served a compelling state interest, and that it was 
sufficiently narrowly tailored.39 
B. The Government’s Right to Control First Amendment Activities In Public Forums or on 
Property it Does Not Own. 
 While governmental efforts to restrict speech activities in nonpublic fora have been 
routinely upheld as we have seen, similar efforts in other areas have just as routinely been meet 
without success.  In Lovell v. Griffin,40 and its progeny, the court addressed the right of 
municipalities to restrict speech activities on their streets and sidewalks.  Such efforts have 
generally been doomed to failure.  This is so because such general streets and sidewalks have 
since the beginning of our nation’s history been the quintessential public forum for the exercise 
of free speech rights.   
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.  
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the 
privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.41 
Thus, in Martin v. Struthers, the Court rejected the constitutionality of a regulation which banned 
door to door solicitation within the City of Struthers, Ohio.  Again speaking in sweeping 
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For centuries it has been the common practice in this and other countries for persons not 
specifically invited to go from home to home and knock on doors or ring doorbells to 
communicate ideas to the occupants or to invite them to political, religious, or other kinds 
of public meetings.  Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed 
to depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not upon the 
determination of the community.  In the instant case, the City of Struthers, Ohio, has 
attempted to make this decision for all its inhabitants.42 
Likewise, content-related partial bans on the use of the streets and sidewalks for 
expressive activity have  had a hard row to hoe to pass constitutional muster.  Ordinances that 
prohibit picketing on a public way within a set distance of a school except for peaceable labor 
picketing failed to get over the constitutional hurdle.43 A ban on picketing on the sidewalks 
surrounding the US Supreme Court building was struck down as it was not a reasonable time, 
place, manner restriction limited to serve a significant government interest.44 A regulation which 
banned only certain types of news racks on sidewalks in Cincinnati was not permissible.45 
Similarly, a regulation which banned charitable solicitations on a door to door basis unless at 
least 75% of the receipts were used for charitable purposes was struck down as violative of the 
First Amendment.46 Such results can even be found in a case involving not publicly owned 
streets or sidewalks, but privately-owned company town streets.  The outright bans on the 
distribution of religious literature on  privately owned sidewalks and streets which in all 
significant respects were identical to a public town sidewalks and streets has been held to violate 
the First Amendment.47 
In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches,48 the Supreme Court struck down a total ban by 
the school district on using district property for religious purposes, as such a ban was not 
viewpoint neutral. 
8C.  Initial U.S. Supreme Court Attention to Governmentally-owned Housing and the First 
Amendment: Tucker v. Texas.  
 The U.S. Supreme Court has on one occasion addressed the specific situation of a public 
housing authority (or at least what was called a housing authority)  and attempts to restrict 
speech on that property.  In Tucker v. Texas, 49 the Supreme Court addressed an appeal from the 
County Court of Medina, Texas in which the Plaintiff Tucker had been convicted of, essentially, 
trespass after notice.50 Tucker was a Jehovah’s Witness engaged in the distribution of religious 
literature to “willing recipients”.51 The locale of his activities was the Hondo Navigation 
Village.52 The village was owned by the Federal Government and was constructed as part of the 
WWII defense effort.53 A war time statute had created the Federal Public Housing Authority to 
create housing for the defense workers.   The court noted that “According to all indications the 
village was freely accessible and open to the public and had the characteristics of a typical 
American town”.54 The village manager order Tucker to discontinue his religious activities on 
the premises, and when Tucker refused, his arrest followed.55 
The court held that there was no principled  difference between the case at bar and the 
Marsh case, the difference simply being that instead of a private corporation owning the town, 
the federal government owned the town.55 “This difference does not affect the result.”56 The 
court held, some thirty years prior to the Perry decision, that “neither Congress nor the Federal 
agencies acting pursuant to Congressional authorization may abridge the freedom of press and 
religion safeguarded by the First Amendment.”57 
Thus, in the first housing authority case to come before the Supreme Court, long before 
9the development of the public forum doctrine, the Court struck down a ban on the distribution of 
religious materials. 
D. The Eleventh Circuit’s Approach to the Problem. 
 In Crowder v. Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta58 and in Daniel v. City of 
Tampa59, the Eleventh Circuit had before it cases arising out of public housing authorities 
attempts to control the use of their property for certain expressive activities.   In Crowder, the 
tenant attempted to hold Bible study meetings in the common facility of the apartment building 
he lived in, which was owned by the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA).60 Crowder wanted to 
use both the building’s auditorium and its library.61 After some complaints Crowder’s activities 
were initially forbidden; then a tenant vote was held  on whether and when to permit the 
meetings, resulting in Crowder being restricted to holding his activities on Friday nights only.62 
When Crowder attempted to hold a meeting at another time, he was arrested for violation of a 
lawful order to leave.63 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by reviewing the public forum doctrine under 
Perry.  It held that the auditorium was a limited public forum, as it was opened by the AHA for a 
wide range of expressive activities, including religious services.64 The library was found to be a 
non-public forum, as it was at best irregularly and infrequently used by the tenants for any type 
of meeting.65 Given the nature of the property, the Circuit held that the initial complete  ban on 
all meetings run by Crowder was not reasonable nor a valid time, place, and manner restriction.66 
Likewise, the court held that the tenant majority vote requirement was an improper content based 
decision prohibited by the First Amendment.67 The Circuit held that the Friday night restriction 
was also improper.  Even if the restriction was assumed to be content neutral, it had to be a time, 
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place, manner restriction which was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest.68 “Because the facilities were not in constant use during the daytime, the Friday-night-
only restriction was not narrowly tailored to serve the substantial government interest in avoiding 
scheduling conflicts.”69 Finally, addressing the specific arrest of Crowder, the court held that 
since the library was a non-public forum, and was being used at the time of the arrest to 
temporarily store furniture, the managements actions were “reasonable and lawful.” on that date. 
70 
A year later, the Eleventh Circuit returned to this problem in the Daniel case.  The case 
began when Daniel sought a preliminary injunction from the federal district court.  Daniel was a 
member of a black rights organization who wished to engage in door to door political expression 
within two Tampa Housing Authority developments.71 The developments had a history of 
serious drug and crime problems, in particular crime caused by non-residents, which led the 
Housing Authority to create a policy barring anyone from being on the property who was not 
specifically “authorized, licensed, or invited”.72 Daniel challenged the policy as being overbroad 
and a violation of his First Amendment rights.73 The District Court, upholding the Magistrate 
Judge’s recommendation, issued the preliminary injunction.  74 The District Court relied upon 
Martin v. Struthers as creating a right in the homeowner to decide whether or not to receive 
distributers of literature.  Thus, Daniel had shown a likelihood of success on the merits, 
warranting the issuance of an injunction.75 This was despite the fact that both the magistrate 
and the District Court held that the THA property was a non-public forum.76 
Daniel’s success was short-lived.  When the case came on for trial on the merits, the 
Authority prevailed before a different district court judge.77 The trial court decision begins by 
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noting that it is far from clear that the forum analysis is applicable in the first instance, as 
Daniel’s physical presence on the property, which was the root cause of his arrest for trespassing, 
was in and of itself, expressive conduct.78 Assuming Daniel’s claim could be so construed, the 
court held that the property of the Authority was neither a traditional public forum nor a 
designated (limited) public forum.  The purpose of the Authority’s property was to be the private 
residences of low income individuals, not for the public exposition of ideas, and thus was not a 
designated forum.79 The court contrasted the property with traditional forums, such as public 
streets and parks, noting that the Authority had never allowed activities such as solicitation, 
canvassing or the distributing of literature on its property.  Accordingly, it was a non-public 
forum.  80 The court held that the policy “easily” met the requirement that it be reasonable and 
not content based, and thus withstood constitutional scrutiny.  The court therefore entered 
judgment as a matter of law for the city at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case.81 
Not surprisingly, the case went up on appeal to the 11th Circuit.  The circuit court 
affirmed the decision.82 The court reviewed and applied the public forum doctrine, and agreed 
with the district court that the property in issue was a nonpublic forum.83 The court noted in 
support of this analysis that the housing authority’s mission is to provide safe housing for its 
residents, that access to the property is controlled and limited to residents, invited guests, and 
those conducting official business.84 The court held the access restrictions were content neutral, 
and a reasonable means of combating the crime within the Authority’s property.  Accordingly, 
the matter passed constitutional muster.85 
E. The Massachusetts Contrary Approach to the Problem. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court addressed this issue in Walker v. Georgetown 
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Housing Authority.86,87 The plaintiff Walker was a tenant of the GHA who challenged the ban 
imposed by the Authority on door-to-door campaigning and soliciting within an elderly 
development.88 The trial court granted summary judgment to the tenant under both the Federal 
and State constitutions, finding that the policy violated the free speech rights of the tenant.89 The 
Authority appealed.  The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the decision of the trial court, under 
both the First Amendment and the state constitution.90 The court began by noting that a similar 
ban imposed by a municipality on all door-to-door canvassing would not stand constitutional 
scrutiny.91 As the court then stated, “We reject the authority’s claim that its streets and 
sidewalks and the doorways of its apartment buildings are not areas to which the same rights [as 
exist with respect to a municipality] apply.”92 The court relied heavily on Martin v. Struthers for 
this position, and rejected the Authority’s position that the streets and sidewalks of its 
development were a non-public forum.93 The court initially declined to adopt the public forum 
doctrine as a decisional tool under the state constitution.94 However, under the federal claim, the 
court immediately found the streets and sidewalks to “fall squarely within the classification of a 
public forum.”95 
The authority is a public entity.  Its property is publicly owned.   There is no apparent 
distinction between its streets and sidewalks and those of a private development.  A 
technical distinction that its ways are not accepted public ways but rather appear to be 
private ways open to the public makes no difference.  The constitutional right of the 
authority’s tenants to receive communications may not be abridged by the blanket 
prohibition of campaigning and solicitation.96 
Rather than looking at the intent of the governmental entity with regard to the property (as 
modern federal precedent required), the Massachusetts court took a very dogmatic approach to 
the issue.  It would appear that short of creating gated communities with check points, or similar 
frank differentiation from the surrounding streets, the Massachusetts court would not find 
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housing authority streets and sidewalks to be anything other than prototypic public fora, 
regardless of the intent of the housing authority.97 Public ownership with a facial  similarity to 
typical streets lead to the conclusion that the area was a prototypic public forum.   No evidence 
was cited that housing property had been the type of property historically reserved for  and used 
for expressive purposes.  In reaching this absolutist conclusion, the Massachusetts court directly 
attacked the reasoning and position of the 11th Circuit, and by inference, that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.    “[T]he reasoning of the Daniel case is questionable.  It seems that, because the 
authority had limited access to its property, the court concluded that the property was not a 
public forum.  The proper question, it seems to us, was whether the authority had a right to limit 
access in the first place.”98 The SJC’s opinion is a direct challenge to the core analytic 
methodology of the public forum doctrine, as the touchstone of said analysis is what is the intent 
of the governmental entity with regard to property it owns - rather than property owned by 
others.  
F. The Fifth Circuit. 
 The Fifth Circuit has also addressed this problem.   In Vasquez v. Housing Authority of 
the City of El Paso, first the District Court for the Western District of Texas, and then a panel of 
the Fifth Circuit dealt with a First Amendment challenge to a no trespass regulation adopted by 
the Housing Authority of the City of El Paso (HACEP).  The District Court upheld the 
regulation.99 Factually the case closely resembled the Massachusetts Walker case.  Vasquez was 
a non-resident who want to go door-to-door within a HACEP development to campaign for a 
county office.100 The development was a typical housing development bounded by public 
streets, with some public streets running through the development.101 The Authority allowed 
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residents and certain “legitimate” non-residents on the property and to go door-to-door, but 
otherwise denied access to the property.102 Vasquez was denied the right to go door-to-door 
campaigning and a resident, De La O, alleged he was denied the right to receive such 
campaigning.103 The District Court began with a review of the Supreme Court public forum 
caselaw, and particularly noted the 11th Circuit’s Daniel decision.  The court rapidly found that 
the development was a non-public forum.104 Accordingly, the court turned to the issue of 
whether or not the regulations were reasonable.  Noting that the regulations combated crime, that 
there was ready access to city streets, that tenants could specifically invite campaigners into the 
property, and were content neutral, the regulations passed muster.105,106 
The matter was appealed to the Fifth Circuit.107 The majority opinion also began by 
repeating the now familiar outline of the Supreme Court’s forum analysis.108 The majority 
quickly agreed that the HACEP developments were  non-public forums.109 The key factors in 
this decision were that residency was limited to a certain class of people, that there were 
generally no public streets or parks within the developments, it was created for the purpose of 
providing affordable housing to the low income,  and that the government did not create the 
housing to provide a public meeting place.110 As the majority held, “this [purpose] necessarily 
mandates a finding that the HACEP developments differ in character from the areas previously 
categorized by the Court as designated public fora.”111 
Despite finding that HACEP developments were nonpublic fora, the court went on to find 
that the authority’s regulations were not reasonable, and thus did not pass even minimum 
rationality review.112 While the regulations were view point neutral, the regulations were not 
reasonable in the circumstances.  The court agreed that safety and crime prevention were 
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legitimate purposes for the regulations.113 The court noted that the developments resembled 
private neighborhoods in the city, and that residents were permitted under the regulations to 
campaign and distribute literature on a door-to-door basis, subject to identification, prior 
permission and time restrictions.114 Additionally, certain guests and were permitted to enter.  In 
light of these facts, the court stated that “we are persuaded beyond peradventure that the 
wholesale exclusion of political candidates and their volunteers from this category [of permitted 
campaigners] unreasonably and unnecessarily interferes with what may well be the primary 
connection between many of HACEP’s residents and the democratic process.”115 
The dissent pointed out that under Cornelius and the other Supreme Court case law, the 
regulations merely needed to be reasonable, not the most reasonable or the only reasonable 
limitation.116 The dissent would find that the differentiation made by the authority based on the 
identity of the speaker to be reasonable, and therefore would uphold the regulations.117 
Following the issuance of this opinion, the 5th Circuit granted a request for rehearing en 
banc and vacated the panel opinion.118 Apparently, the named plaintiff then died, and a motion 
to substitute parties was denied, leading to the appeal being dismissed as moot prior to en banc 
reconsideration of the issue.119 
The Fifth Circuit did eventually return to this issue in the related case of De La O v. 
HACEP.120 It did so in the appeal from the related district court case filed by the widow of a 
plaintiff in the Vasquez appeal.121 After HACEP prevailed in the District Court on the same 
basis as it had previously done so, this second appeal followed.  While the appeal was pending, 
the housing authority amended its regulations to now allow non-residents to go door to door for 
political or religious activities within its developments.122 
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 The Fifth Circuit rejected a mootness challenge made in light of the amendments, and 
began its constitutional analysis by noting that the plaintiff, a non-campaigning resident, had the 
same First Amendment protections as a receiver of information as the actual campaigners would 
possess.123 The Court then toured the landscape of the public forum doctrine, and noted that 
public housing developments have been repeatedly held to constitute non-public fora.124 Noting 
that the housing authority primary purpose was to house needy individuals and families and not 
to provide a facility for the expression of ideas, or a meeting place for the populace, the court 
held that “it seems obvious, therefore, that for purposes of our further analysis, HACEP’s 
facilities are non-public fora.125 
Addressing the issue of whether or not the revised regulations passed muster, the circuit 
held that it was beyond question that the regulations were content neutral, and thus passed 
scrutiny if they were reasonable in light of the purpose of the forum.  The housing authority’s 
interest in crime prevention was obviously weighty, and there clearly existed multiple alternative 
channels of communication, and the burden on the plaintiffs minimal.126 The regulations were 
constitutionally valid. 
 Turning to the problem of the original regulations, the Fifth Circuit noted that its prior 
panel in Vasquez had found the regulations an unreasonable restriction, even for a non-public 
forum.  However, this panel did not adopt that position. The panel did note that these prior 
regulations presented a “closer question”, but held that “in light of the overriding need to provide 
safe housing, they are constitutional”, with one exception.127 The panel keyed in on an issue not 
previously discussed, that being whether the requirement that the authority must pre-approve the 
content of any flyer or handout violated the First Amendment.128 Finding that it is “undeniable” 
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that view point restrictions on content would violate the Constitution, the case was remanded for 
the district court to make finding on that specific issue.129 
G. The Supreme Court Revisits The Issue. 
 In 2003 this issue percolated its way back to the Supreme Court in Virginia v. Hicks.130 
The case took a long route to get to the Supreme Court.   The first reported decision was out of 
the Virginia Court of Appeals  in 2000.  In this initial decision, a panel of the Court of Appeals 
addressed a fairly typical factual situation.  A development of the Richmond Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority was deeded by the City of Richmond certain former city streets.131 The 
Authority posted no-trespassing signs on the streets, and Hicks was given a no trespassing order 
by the Authority.132 Hicks was eventually arrested for violating the order and challenged the 
constitutionality of the trespass policy in his criminal trial.133 The policy indicated that non-
residents who were invited to the property were not affected by the policy, nor were those on the 
premises for legitimate business, and further there was a process for having a barment order 
lifted.134 The development was the site of significant drug and criminal activity.135 There was 
also a process for requesting permission to access the property to distribute flyers or other 
materials.136 
The majority opinion found that the policy did not violate the First Amendment speech 
provisions.  Relying upon the Daniel opinion, the majority found, with little discussion, that the 
premises were a non-public forum and the trespass policy to be reasonable and content neutral.137 
The dissent however, would find that the property was a traditional public forum.138 The dissent 
noted particularly that the streets were not gated or barricaded and remained open to all vehicular 
traffic and the sidewalks open to all passers-through.139 In light of these facts, the dissent would 
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hold that while the “grounds and buildings of a public housing development are a ‘non-public 
forum’ designed to provide safe housing for its residents, the public streets and sidewalks” were 
public forum.  The dissent distinguished Daniel and relied upon the Marsh decision to support its 
approach.140 
Review en banc by the Court of Appeals followed.141 The en banc court held that the 
barment-trespass procedure violated the First Amendment and reverse the underlying criminal 
conviction.142 In a 6-5 decision, the majority applied the Public Forum doctrine to analyze the 
matter.  The majority noted (reminiscent of the Massachusetts court) that the “streets and 
sidewalks surrounding Whitcomb Court did not lose their public forum status when the City of 
Richmond deeded them to the RRHA and put some signs on the street indicating they were now 
private property.”143 Accordingly, when the strict scrutiny standard of review was applied, the 
no trespass policy did not pass muster.144 
The dissent would have rejected the plaintiff’s challenge as an improper collateral 
challenge on his barment status.145 Additionally, the minority would have found the barment 
rule not overbroad, as its legitimate scope exceeded any impermissible application.146 Finally, 
the dissent would find that the physical characteristics of the property were sufficient to establish 
the area as a non-public forum and the restrictions on speech reasonable, limited and justified, 
thus surmounting the constitutional hurdle.147 
Naturally, an appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia followed.   The Virginia Supreme 
Court only reached the overbreadth argument and on that basis, reversed and remanded the 
matter.148 The court noted that in its view, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that 
governmental policies which grant officials broad and unfettered discretion to regulate speech 
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violate the overbreadth doctrine.149 After review of the factual record, the Supreme Court of 
Virginia concluded that the RRHA official, Rodgers, did have “unfettered discretion to 
determine not only who has a right to speak on the Housing Authority’s property, but she may 
prohibit speech that she finds personally distasteful or offensive even though such speech may be 
protected by the First Amendment.  She may even prohibit speech that is political or religious in 
nature.  However, a citizen’s First Amendment rights cannot be predicated upon the unfettered 
discretion of a governmental official.”150 The majority specifically noted but did not reach the 
public forum doctrine arguments raised by the parties and the courts below.151 
The dissent to the opinion would have found that Hicks did not have standing to raise a 
facial challenge to the trespass policy.   The dissent notes that by its terms, the policy is directed 
not at pure speech, but at conduct, i.e., trespassing.152 As such, the dissent opines that the court 
should have applied a different standard, that being “where conduct and not merely speech is 
involved.... the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in 
relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”153 A facial challenge will not lie where the 
policy is not substantially overbroad in a relative sense.  Applying this standard, the dissent 
found that the policy was not overbroad, and thus Hicks could not raise a facial challenge.154 
The matter then reached the U.S. Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia, for a unanimous court, 
reversed the judgment of the Virginia Supreme Court, holding that the no trespass policy was not 
constitutionally overbroad.155 The court began by narrowly defining the issue before it to be the 
facial validity of the trespass policy under the overbreadth doctrine.156 The Supreme Court 
reviewed the factual history and noted particularly that Hicks was not engaged in constitutionally 
protected conduct when he was arrested.157 In analyzing the matter, the court reiterated its 
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overbreadth jurisprudence and stressed that a law’s application to protected speech under the 
First Amendment be substantial, “not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the scope of 
the law’s plainly legitimate applications, before applying the ‘strong medicine’ of overbreadth 
invalidation.”158 
Applying the rule set out, the Supreme Court noted that the policy, written and unwritten, 
did not appear to implicate First Amendment activities, as the policy in toto included such 
protected activities within the scope of the provision for entry for legitimate business or social 
purposes.159 Even as applied to post no trespass notice entries for First Amendment covered 
activities, the court stated that such punishment is directed not at the protected activity - speech - 
but the non-protected non-expressive conduct of re-entry.160 Accordingly, the Supreme Court 
held that Hicks had failed to show that the trespass policy “prohibits a ‘substantial’ amount of 
protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications.”161 The court reversed the 
Virginia Supreme Court and remanded the matter for further proceedings.162 
On remand, the Virginia Supreme Court rejected Hicks’ remaining First Amendment 
challenge, that being that the policy was unconstitutionally vague.163 Applying well settled law 
holding that a plaintiff may not challenge the facial vagueness of a law as applied to the conduct 
of others where he has engaged in some conduct that is clearly proscribed by law, the Virginia 
Supreme Court held that the no-trespass policy could not have been clearer regarding Hicks’ 
conduct.  Accordingly, his vagueness challenge failed, and at long last, his trespass conviction 
was upheld.164 
H. CONCLUSION. 
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 The issue of the use of no-trespass orders and the public forum doctrine, as well as 
related issues beyond the scope of this article, has received varied academic review, from a frank 
“advocacy article” on how to oppose these orders,165 to sweeping calls for legislative reforms,166 
to various case reviews.167 
There are several starting points to be recalled.  Essentially every court to address this 
issue has applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s public forum doctrine without reservation, with one 
notable caveat.  In Walker v. Georgetown Housing Authority, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court explicitly refused to adopt this doctrine for use under the state constitution.168 In 
fact, the Massachusetts court even questioned the validity of this system of analysis under the 
federal case law.169 
It seems clear that what is needed in deciding such cases is a clear and detailed review of 
the facts involved and the specific nature of the premises involved, under the U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent.  The Massachusetts court rejected this approach, adopted by all other courts.   
Relying heavily upon Martin v. Struthers, the Walker court simply rejected the contention that a 
public housing authority’s property differed at all from the property of any municipality.170 The 
Massachusetts court focused almost exclusively on the fact that the housing authority is a public 
entity.171 The court suggests that a public entity should not be entitled to limit access to its 
property at all, or in other words, that the intent of the governmental entity should not be 
material.172 In doing so, the Massachusetts court relied upon Tucker (government village case) 
and Marsh (company town case).  The Massachusetts court challenged the analysis used by the 
Eleventh Circuit in deciding the Daniel case: “the reasoning of the court in Daniel case is 
questionable.  It seems that, because the authority had limited access to its property, the court 
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concluded that the property was not a public forum.  The proper questions, it seems to us, was 
whether the authority had a right to limit access in the first place.”173 
Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that it is essential, in deciding cases 
involving the free speech use of publically owned property, to look to the intent of the 
government owner, and the historical use of the property.174 While Massachusetts does  not 
strictly follow this methodology, all the other major opinions have done so.   Of course, as noted 
above, applying this doctrine does not mean that the housing authority necessarily prevails in all 
cases, nor should its application lead to such skewed results.  A nuanced, public forum analysis, 
carefully reviewing all factual elements, including the intent of the governmental entity, the 
nature of and historic use of the specific property (i.e., possible different treatment for an 
auditorium versus a library), and the specific proposed access best balances the rights and needs 
of all the parties.   
 Additionally, as the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed, courts must keep in mind 
that there is a difference between the government acting as sovereign, and the government acting 
as landowner,175 a difference that the Massachusetts SJC may well not accept.176 There is a 
difference in kind between situations where the government regulates expressive activities on 
property of others, and situations where the government regulates such activities on its own 
property. 
 Applying the public forum doctrine is not a guarantee that the public housing authority 
will be able to restrict its property in any way it believes is justified.  As the Crowder, Daniel 
and Vasquez opinions indicate, the circuit courts have not been reluctant to strike down 
restrictions, in whole or in part,  even in non-public forums,177 where such restrictions are not 
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tailored to meet the governmental intent and simply sweep too broadly.  A total ban on 
campaigning and soliciting can certainly be seen as not even a reasonable restriction tailored to 
the problem sought to be addressed by the authority, and may not pass even minimal rationality 
review.  The use of a fact specific approach to the analysis of barment orders or other similar 
restrictions to access and use of public housing property for expressive purposes, rather than a 
fairly absolutist approach, -  if it is public it must be open - adopted by the Massachusetts court, 
is a  guarantee that the court will closely look at the nature of the property in issue, the problem 
being addressed, and the nature of the proposed solution. 178 By undertaking a detailed review 
of the property, the intended use, the access requested, and the need for the access in a historical 
context is fully in keeping with our constitutional tradition of balancing conflicting rights and 
responsibilities.179 
To the extent that courts, such a Massachusetts, would find the fact that a street or 
sidewalk within a housing development that appears similar to those of the municipality (perhaps 
containing only no trespass signs)  to be dispositive in concluding that a bar to entry in such 
areas breaches the First Amendment, the courts seem to be inviting a policy of segregating or 
gating off public housing from the neighborhoods in which it sits.  If the only way to distinguish 
the interior of a housing development from other public spaces or thoroughfares  for First 
Amendment purposes is to create physical barriers to entry, one must ask what impression is 
being given concerning the residents of such housing?  Further, significant attempts to limit 
access to housing areas creates their own considerable legal problems, as such attempts conflict 
with other statutory and constitutional rights of public housing tenants.180 
A careful balancing of the rights of the governmental entity as property owner, not as 
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sovereign, the rights of all the tenants, even if those rights conflict, and the rights of those who 
seek to pursue First Amendment activities within a housing development is the most reasonable 
approach to dealing with a complex public policy concern.  The general history of the First 
Amendment has shown that such rights are not absolute, and the considered approach of the 
courts under the public forum doctrine is the best analytic approach to resolving these 
complicated issues. 
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